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FIRE SAFETY IN NASA HUMAN-CREW SPACECRAFT
FIRE SAFETY ALWAYS RECEIVES PRIORITY ATTENTION IN NASA MISSION
DESIGNS AND OPERATIONS, WITH EMPHASIS ON FIRE PREVENTION AND
MATERIAL ACCEPTANCE STANDARDS
RECENTLY, INTEREST IN SPACECRAFT FIRE-SAFETY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT HAS INCREASED BECAUSE
• IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN LOW-GRAVITY AND NORMAL-GRAVITY COMBUSTION
SUGGESTS THAT PRESENT FIRE.SAFETY TECHNIQUES MAY BE
INADEQUATE OR, AT BEST, NON.OPTIMAL
• THE COMPLEX AND PERMANENT ORBITAL OPERATIONS IN FREEDOM
DEMAND A HIGHER LEVEL OF SAFETY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES
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SPACECRAFT FIRE RISK STRATEGIES
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SPACECRAFT FIRE-SAFETY STATE OF THE ART
PREVENTION
LARGE DATABASE AVAILABLE ON ACCEPTABLE "NON-
FLAMMABLE" MATERIALS
NASA TEST METHODS UNDER EVALUATION BY NIST;
MODIFICATIONS ARE SUGGESTED
RECENT RESEARCH DEFINED LOW-GRAVITY FLAMMABILITY
LIMITS AND VENTILATION EFFECTS
[=IRE DETECTION
AIRPLANE SMOKE DETECTOR DESIGNS ADAPTED TO
SPACECRAFT
NO SPACE-RELATED DATA
FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT
SPACECRAFT EXTINGUISHING AGENTS SELECTED BY
SYSTEM ANALYSES
RECENT RESEARCH DEFINED RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF
AGENTS AS ATMOSPHERIC SUPPRESSANTS
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CURRENT PRACTICESIN FIRE PREVENTIONFOR SPACECRAFT
LIMITING MATERIALS, AS FAR AS PRACTICAL, TO THOSE THAT ARE "NON-
FLAMMABLE", BASED ON NHB 8060.1 FLAMMABILITY TESTS
AVOIDANCE OF IGNITION SOURCES, THROUGH ELECTRICAL INSULATION
AND GROUNDING, OVERPRESSURE CONTAINMENT, AND THERMAL/-
ELECTRICAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING PRACTICES FOR WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL,
FLUID LEAK PREVENTION, "FLAMMABLES" ISOLATION, AND SO ON
NASAELECTRICALWIRE INSULATIONFLAMMABILITYTEST
NHB 8060.1C TEST 4
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PROBLEMS IN FIRE PREVENTION FOR SPACECRAFT
MANY COMMON ITEMS, PARTICULARLY COMMERCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND
PERSONAL USE ITEMS, CANNOT PASS THE FLAMMABILITY TEST. THESE
ARE PERMI]-I'ED ONBOARD SPACECRAFT WHEN CONTROLLED THROUGH
ISOLATION, STORAGE PROTECTION, OR BARRIERS. NEVERTHELESS
- CONFIGURATION CHANGES MAY OCCUR DURING MISSIONS
- FOAM MATERIALS, VELCRO PATCHES, ETC., POSE SPECIAL FLAMMA-
BILITY PROBLEMS (SMOLDERING, PARTICLE EXPULSION)
MATERIAL FIRE HAZARDS MAY INCREASE IN THE FUTURE FOR FREEDOM
- GREATER VARIETY OF COMMERCIAL AND TEST MATERIALS
- HIGHER PROBABILITY OF EXPOSURE TO IGNITION "INCIDENTS"
- CHANGES AND RELAXATION OF SAFETY ATTITUDES (LONG MISSIONS)
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF MICROGRAVITY COMBUSTION QUESTIONS
THE RELEVANCE OF NORMAL-GRAVITY-TEST ACCEPTANCE STANDARDS TO
LOW-GRAVITY FLAMMABILITY BEHAVIOR
CURRENT PRACTICES IN FIRE DETECTION FORSPACECRAFT
SHUI'rLE IS EQUIPPED WITH NINE STATE-OF-THE-ART IONIZATION
SMOKE DETECTORS (CARGO-BAY LABORATORIES HAVE SIX OR
MORE ADDITIONAL DETECTORS)
SHUTTLE DETECTORS HAVE INTERNAL FANS FOR PARTICLE SEPA-
RATION (DUST PARTICLE BYPASS OF IONIZATION CHAMBER) AND
FOR ADEQUATE ATMOSPHERIC SAMPLING
SHUTrLE DETECTORS ARE MONITORED TO MEASURE PARTICLE
CONCENTRATION AND TO ALARM AT PRESET CONCENTRATIONS
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FIRE DETECTION IN THE SHUTTLE
IOBIZATION-TYPE
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PROBLEMS IN FIRE DETECTION FOR SPACECRAFT
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STANDARD SENSORS IN RESPONDING TO THE
UNICiUECHARACTERISTICS OF M1CROGRAVITY FIRES IS UNCERTAIN
- SMOKE AND AEROSOL PARTICLE SIZE, SIZE DISTRIBUTION, AND
DENSITY ARE UNKNOWN
• MICROGRAVlTY FLAMES ARE STEADY (FLICKER CIRCUITS DO NOT
IDENTIFY THESE FLAMES)
- THE HEAT AND MASS TRANSPORT OF FIRE "SIGNATURES" TO THE
SENSOR ARE DIFFERENT, INFLUENCING RESPONSE TIMES
SPECIFIC FIRE SCENARIOS AND RISK MODELS, NECESSARY TO GUIDE
OPTIMUM SENSOR SPACING AND LOCATION, ARE LACKING
TRADEOFFSFOROPTIMUMDECISIONSON SENSITIVITYVS. FALSEALARMS,
MANUALVS. AUTOMATEDRESPONSES,AND SO FORTH,ARELACKING
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CURRENTPRACTICESIN FIREEXTINGUISHMENTFORSPACECRAFT
SHUTrLE EQUIPPED WITH THREE FIXED AND FOUR PORTABLE STATE-OF-
THE.ART HALON 1301 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
OPERATION OF FIXED EXTINGUISHER FROM PANEL REQUIRES ACTUATION
OF AN "ARM" SWITCH FOLLOWED BY THE "DISCHARGE" SWITCH
NORMAL COMBUSTION PRODUCTS OF CO2AND WATER ARE REMOVED FROM
THE ATMOSPHERE BY THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
OTHER COMBUSTION PRODUCTS, SUCH AS CO, ARE REMOVABLE, IN TRACE
QUANTITIES ONLY, BY AN ACTIVATED CARBON FILTER
MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED AFTER EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGE FOR
SUBSEQUENT GROUNDCLEANUP
FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT IN THE SHUTTLE
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SPACE STATION FREEDOM FIRE PROTECTION
MAJOR ISSUES
THE COMPLEX CONFIGURATION, VARIED CREW ACTIVITIES, AND SCIENTIFIC
AND COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FIRE HAZARDS.
THE LONG-TERM, PERMANENT ORBITAL MISSION INCREASES THE PROBA-
BILITY OF FIRE "EVENTS" TO NEAR UNITY.
THE INITIAL ASSEMBLY PERIOD POSES PARTICULAR CONCERNS
- NO MEANS OF REMOTE MODULE ISOLATION OR FIRE CONTROL TO
COMBAT FIRE EVENTS DURING INTERIM UNA'i'rENDED TIMES
. INCREASED MATERIAL FLAMMABILITY IN HIGHER-O=-CONCENTRATION
ATMOSPHERES (REQUIRED FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES)
THE DEPENDENCIES AND TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN MANUAL AND AUTOMATED
FIRE PROTECTION ARE UNRESOLVED. THE AUTOMATED DATA MANAGE-
MENT SYSTEM MAY FAIL DURING A FIRE, FOR EXAMPLE.
THE APPLICATION OF THE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF LOW-GRAVITY FIRE
BEHAVIOR TOWARD PRACTICAL FIRE-PROTECTION HARDWARE AND OPERA-
TIONS FOR SPACE IS STILL IN A VERY EARLY STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
SEVERE DESIGN CONSTRAINTS ON POWER, MASS, AND VOLUME DEMAND
SIMPLE YET HIGHLY EFFICIENT DETECTION-SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
SUMMARY
_E_r¢_[_3" _'_'_'_ CURRENT SPACECRAFT FIRE-SAFETY PRACTICES,
BASED MAINLY ON SKILLED APPLICATIONS OF GROUND AND AIRCRAFT
TECHNIQUES, ARE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE
O_]I-E_ FOR FUTURE SPACECRAFT AND MISSIONS, HOWEVER,
ADVANCES IN FIRE-SAFETY STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY ARE
ESSENTIAL
- THE GROWING BODY OF KNOWLEDGE OF MICROGRAVITY COMBUSTION
SCIENCE OFFERS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVED AND MORE
EFFICIENT FIRE-SAFETY TECHNIQUES
- THE COMPLEX, PERMANENT ORBITAL OPERATIONS OF FREEDOM
IMPOSE NEW DEMANDS ON FIRE SAFETY AND INCREASE THE
PROBABILITY OF FIRE INCIDENTS
- NEW INFORMATION IS NEEDED ON THE APPLICATION OF MICROGRAVITY
COMBUSTION SCIENCE AND QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS TO
PRACTICAL CONCEPTS OF FIRE SAFETY
_EF0=0"@ RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY IN SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY
PROMISE REDUCED RISK FACTORS AND IMPROVED FLEXIBILITY AND
EFFICIENCY IN SPACECRAFT TECHNIQUES TO PROMOTE GREATER
MISSION SAFETY AND ENCOURAGE BETTER UTILIZATION OF FUTURE
SPACECRAFT
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COMPARISON OF FLAMES ON THIN SOLID SURFACES
(PAPER, FOR EXAMPLE)
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PROBLEMS IN FIRE EXTINGUISHMENTFOR SPACECRAFT
LIMITED SELECTION OF USEFUL EXTINGUISHING AGENTS FOR SPACE
- NONGASEOUS OR MIXED-PHASE (FOAM) TYPES NOT SUITABLE
- REMOVAL OF AGENT AND PRODUCTS FROM CLOSED ENVIRONMENT IS
A CRITICAL CONCERN
HALON 1301 AND SIMILAR HALOCARBONS ARE TO BE PHASED OUT OF USE
IN NEXT DECADE BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
EFFECTIVENESS OF AGENT DISPERSAL AND DELIVERY MODE UNDER THE
DIFFERING MASS AND HEAT TRANSPORT RATES IN MICROGRAVITY HAVE
YET TO BE DEMONSTRATED
FOR THE PERMANENT ORBITAL MISSIONS OF FREEDOM, UNKNOWN LONG-
TERM TOXIC AND CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF AGENT AND PRODUCT RESIDUES
ARE A CONCERN
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES AND DEMONSTRATIONSOF
MICROGRAVITY FIRE BEHAVIORRELEVANTTO FIRE SAFETY
IN SPACE
PARABOLIC AIRPLANE FLIGHTS
FREE-FALL DROP TOWERS
SKYLAB 1974
SHUTTLE SSCE (STS 41, 40) 1990, 1991
KIMZEY 1966
NASA LEWIS, ESA CURRENT
NASA LEWIS 5.2 SEC:
WiRE INSULATION
SOLID SAMPLES
1971
1974 TO CURRENT
NASA LEWIS 2.2 SEC:
SOLID SAMPLES
PARTICLE CLOUDS
PREMIXED GASES
1970 TO CURRENT
1979 TO 1990
1980 TO CURRENT
VARIOUS UNIVERSITY
(1.0 TO 1.4 SEC):
DROPLETS, AEROSOLS CURRENT
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NASA WIRING FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS
PROGRAM
JULY 2324, 1991
DR. DANIEL R. MULVILLE
DIRECTOR, TECHNICAL STANDARDS DIVISION
NASA HEADQUARTERS
• OBJECTIVES
- IMPROVE SAFETY, PERFORMANCE, AND RELIABILn_ OF WIRING
SYSTEMS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS
- DEVELOP IMPROVED WIRING TECHNOLOGIES FOR NASA FLIGHT
PROGRAMS
APPROACH
- IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS/NEED FOR FUTURE NASA PROGRAMS
- CHARACTERITI:: EXISTING SYSTEMS
- DEVELOP QUALIFICATION TEST METHODS AND STANDARDS
- DEVELOP DATA TO SUPPORT CERTIFICATION
- TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY TO NASA FLIGHT PROGRAMS
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NASA WORKSHOP ON WIRING
FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS
CODEQE
MEETING TOPICS
- NEAI_TERM NASA SPACE MISSIONS AND WIRING REQUIREMENTS
- EXISTING CANDIDATE WIRING SYSTEMS
- DATA BASE ON EXISTING CANDIDATE WIRING SYSTEMS:
COMPLETENESS, CERTIFICATION AND ADDITIONAL NASA
UNIQUE TESTS
LONG-TERM NASA SPACE MISSIONS AND WIRING REQUIREMENTS
WIRING TECHNOLOGIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT
NASA UNIQUE TESTING REQUIREMENTS
TECHNOLOGIES WHICH MAY SUPPORT FUTURE REQUIREMENTS,
I.F_ ADVANCED PROTECTION CIRCUITRY
m
PLANNED ACTIVITIES
- NASA WORKSHOP ON WIRING FOR SPACE APPIJCATIONS- JULY 1991
• NASA REQUIREMENTS
• STATUS OF CURRENT WIRING TECHNOLOGY
• IDENTIFICATION OF REQUIRED NASA PROGRAM EFFORTS
- FORMULATE APPLIED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM TO ADDRESS NASA
NEEDS - NEAR TERM AND FAR TERM - AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1991
- REVIEW/APPROVE PROGRAM PLAN -OCTOBER 1991
• AEROSPACE WIRING SYSTEM PROGRAM ($K)
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FYgs FY9S
80 320 450 700 650 450
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